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using a real-time data set. Estimates based on the deviation of inﬂation from the Bundesbank’s
inﬂation target as threshold variable suggest a switch to a stronger output gap response in the reaction
function if past inﬂation was high. The reaction function in the regime with higher inﬂation implies an
overall less contractionary monetary policy than that for the low inﬂation regime. A modiﬁed model
with three regimes shows this result to be related to periods of substantial excess inﬂation. We explore
a threshold reaction function with a moving inﬂation target that captures a gradual adjustment of
an intermediate to a long-term inﬂation target and ﬁnd the Bundesbank to follow a more restrictive
monetary policy stance if inﬂation is above the intermediate-term inﬂation target.
Keywords: monetary policy reaction function, threshold regression, instrumental variables, real-time
data
JEL Classification: E52, E58, C22, C24
Martin Mandler
University of Giessen
Department of Economics and Business
Licher Str. 66, 35394 Giessen, Germany
phone: +49(0)641–9922173, fax.: +49(0)641–9922179
email: Martin.Mandler@wirtschaft.uni–giessen.de
∗I am indebted to Christina Gerberding, Franz Seitz and Andreas Worms for providing me with
the data set for their paper. Helpful suggestions by participants at the 2011 Annual Conference of
the Western Economic Associatíon are gratefully aknowledged.
1 Introduction
This paper presents evidence on threshold eﬀects in the monetary policy reaction func-
tion of the Deutsche Bundesbank. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant changes to the Bundesbank’s
reaction function depending on the size of the deviation of actual inﬂation from the
Bundesbank’s target.
In the two decades before monetary policy in Germany was ﬁnally handed over to the
European Central Bank (ECB) the Bundesbank established a reputation for success-
fully maintaining price stability even when faced with adverse shocks as in the late
1970s and early 1990s. The ECB now has the same primary objective of price stability
that guided the Bundesbank’s monetary policy. With the intention of enabling the
ECB to pursue a similarly successful monetary policy, the objectives and many institu-
tional features of the ECB were set up in close resemblance to those of the Bundesbank.
Hence, empirical investigations into how the Bundesbank conducted monetary policy
can provide helpful insights for the monetary policy of the ECB.
In this study we focus on nonlinearities in the Bundsbank’s monetary policy reaction.
We extend a monetary policy reaction based on a standard forward-looking Taylor
rule by including shifts in the reaction function coeﬃcients depending on past inﬂa-
tion. Surprisingly, our results show that the Bundesbank’s reaction function which is
associated with high inﬂation in the previous quarter implies actually a less restrictive
monetary policy than the reaction function that prevails in times of previously low in-
ﬂation. We show this feature to be robust across a broad range of speciﬁcations. Only
by specifying a moving intermediate-term inﬂation target for the Bundesbank similar
to the one assumed for the Fed in Bunzel and Enders (2010) we ﬁnd evidence that an
increase in inﬂation above this moving intermediate inﬂation target triggers a much
more restrictive monetary policy relative to the monetary policy reaction function for
inﬂation rates below the target.
Compared to the estimates for the Fed presented in Bunzel and Enders (2010) the
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Bundesbank’s response to inﬂation did not change much across regimes and was larger
(smaller) than that of the Fed if inﬂation was low (high). In all regimes the Bundesbank
reacted less than the Fed to the output gap.
This paper adds to the literature on estimated monetary policy reaction functions based
on real-time data. While there is an extensive literature on the Federal Reserve’s reac-
tion function estimated from real-time data (e.g. Boivin, 2006; Orphanides, 2001) the
reaction functions of the ECB and particularly that of the Bundesbank have received
less attention. Gerdesmeier and Roﬃa (2004) and Sauer and Sturm (2007) present
real-time estimates for Taylor rules for the ECB while Clausen and Meier (2005) and
Gerberding et al. (2005) estimate Taylor rules for the Bundesbank from real-time data.
The data set compiled by Gerberding et al. (2005) is more extensive than the one con-
sidered by Clausen and Meier (2004) because it includes additional time series for the
Bundesbank’s implicit inﬂation target (“price norm”) and for the Bundesbank’s own
estimates of potential output. In this paper we use this data set which the authors
kindly made available to us.
The central modiﬁcation in our empirical models compared to the literature is the
inclusion of a threshold eﬀect. Univariate threshold models have been introduced by
Tong (1978) and Tong and Lim (1980) and allow for the coeﬃcients in an estimated
equation to shift dependent on the value of a threshold variable.1
Only few other empirical studies consider threshold eﬀects in a monetary policy reac-
tion function. The most recent and most similar one to this paper is by Bunzel and
Enders (2010). They estimate Taylor rules for the Federal Reserve (Fed) with threshold
eﬀects but consider only reaction functions in which the Fed reacts to current inﬂa-
tion and output gaps. The empirical literature, however, suggests that forward-looking
monetary policy reaction functions in which the central bank responds to forecasts of
future inﬂation and output gaps are more appropriate descriptions of monetary policy
(e.g. Clarida et al. 1998). In our paper we apply the threshold instrumental vari-
1See Tong (1990) for an extensive survey.
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able estimator suggested by Caner and Hansen (2004) which enables us to investigate
threshold eﬀects in forward-looking monetary policy reaction functions.
Bec et al. (2002) estimate Taylor rules with threshold eﬀects for the Banque de France,
the Deutsche Bundesbank and the U.S. Fed. Our paper diﬀers from theirs in important
ways. First, we use a real-time data set that approximates more closely the informa-
tion policymakers at the Bundesbank responded to than the ex-post revised data used
in their study. Second, they assume the central banks’ reaction function to switch
depending on the sign of the output gap. In contrast, our focus is on inﬂation as the
variable triggering regime changes in monetary policy and we estimate the numerical
threshold value instead of just assuming it.
As in our paper Castro (2008) focuses on regime changes in monetary policy caused
by inﬂation. Similarly to Petersen (2007) he estimates smooth transition models for
the monetary policy reaction functions of the U.S. Fed and the ECB. He shows that
Euro area inﬂation in excess of the ECB’s inﬂation target of 2% leads to a stronger
response of the ECB to inﬂation and the output gap but does not derive his results
from real-time data. Martin and Milas (2004) and Taylor and Davradakis (2006) use
threshold models to study the Bank of England’s monetary policy reaction function.
Both studies present evidence for the Bank of England to tighten monetary policy in
a non-linear way if inﬂation moves out of a zone around the inﬂation target.
Generally, this literature ﬁnds evidence for signiﬁcant threshold eﬀects in the monetary
policy reaction functions of the various central banks. Above the inﬂation threshold
the central banks tend to react more aggressively to both inﬂation and to the output
gap. While we present similar results for the Bundesbank our ﬁndings diﬀer from those
in the literature in one important aspect: We do not ﬁnd a uniformly and signiﬁcantly
stronger response to inﬂation if inﬂation exceeds the estimated threshold.
Our paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the structure of the monetary
policy reaction function and explains how to estimate a threshold version of it. Section
3 provides some information on the data. Section 4 presents the results for various
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versions of our threshold monetary policy reaction function and Section 5 concludes.
2 The threshold model for the Bundesbank’s reaction
function
As a starting point for investigating the Bundesbank’s monetary policy reaction func-
tion we use a forward-looking Taylor rule with partial adjustment of the actual interest
rate (Clarida et al., 1998). The Taylor rule speciﬁes how the short-term interest rate
controlled by the central bank responds to forecasts of inﬂation and of the output gap
and can be written in reduced form as
it = γ0 + γπEtπt+n + γyEtyt+m + γiit−1 + νt, (1)
with γ0, γπ, γy and γi as coeﬃcients. n and m are the central bank’s forecast horizons
for the inﬂation rate π and for the output gap y. The autoregressive term captures the
gradual adjustment of the interest rate to the level desired by the central bank.
If the central bank’s own internal forecasts for inﬂation and for the output gap are
not observable the standard approach is to replace them by their initial (unrevised)
estimates in quarters t+ n and t+m, (πt+n|t+n, yt+m|t+m)
it = γ0 + γππt+n|t+n + γyyt+m|t+m + γiit−1 + t. (2)
The error term t summarizes both the approximation error νt and the forecast errors
for the inﬂation rate and for the output gap,
t = γπ(Etπt+n − πt+n|t+n) + γy(Etyt+m − yt+m|t+m) + νt. (3)
Accounting for the correlation between the explanatory variables (πt+n|t+n and yt+m|t+m)
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and the error term, the parameters of the monetary policy reaction function (2) can
be estimated using the generalized methods of moments (GMM) and appropriate in-
struments.
Estimating a Bundesbank reaction function like equation (2) possibly conceals impor-
tant nonlinearities. As discussed in the introduction, some empirical studies have found
evidence for threshold eﬀects in the monetary policy reaction function of many central
banks, i.e. for endogenous regime-shifts in the reaction coﬃcients depending on the
state of the economy. One cause of such nonlinearities might be asymmetries in the
central bank’s loss function, such as e.g. the central bank attaching diﬀerent impor-
tance to positive deviations of inﬂation from its target compared to negative deviations
of the same size (e.g. Bunzel and Enders, 2010, pp. 936). Another explanation for
a nonlinear monetary policy reaction function is explored by Aksoy et al. (2006) and
Orphanides and Wilcox (2003). They propose a loss function for the central bank that
implies a target zone for the inﬂation rate. As long as inﬂation remains within the
target zone monetary policy remains passive. If a shock, however, pushes inﬂation
above this range the central bank responds vigorously. Cukierman (1992) and Cukier-
man and Meltzer (1992) argue that concerns of the central bank about a loss of public
conﬁdence in its commitment to the inﬂation target cause a more aggressive central
bank response to sizable inﬂationary excesses than to small ones.
One way to model empirically the dependence of the central bank reaction function on
the state of the economy is a threshold model. Using (2) as a starting point a threshold
reaction function with two regimes can be written as
it = (α0 + α1πt+n|t+n + α2yt+m|t+m + α3it−1)It(xt−d ≤ τ)
+(1− It(xt−d ≤ τ))(β0 + β1πt+n|t+n + β2yt+m|t+m + β3it−1) + ηt. (4)
It is an indicator which takes on the value of one if the threshold variable xt−d does
not exceed the threshold value τ in period t − d and zero otherwise. The model (4)
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implies two piecewise linear reaction functions. If the threshold variable is less than or
equal to τ the reaction function is given by α0 + α1πt+n|t+n + α2yt+m|t+m + α3it−1 + ηt
otherwise it is given by β0 + β1πt+n|t+n + β2yt+m|t+m + β3it−1 + ηt.
A test for the presence of threshold eﬀects is a test of the hypothesis H0 : α0 = β0,
α1 = β1, α2 = β2, α3 = β3. Since the threshold value τ is an unidentiﬁed nuisance
parameter under the null hypothesis it is not possible to employ a standard F-test.
Following Hansen (1996, 1997) and Caner and Hansen (2004) we construct a Wald
statistic (supW ) for the null hypothesis of no threshold eﬀects as the supremum of
Wald statistics for H0 for each potential threshold value. P-values are obtained from
the empirical distribution of supW constructed by Monte-Carlo simulation (Caner and
Hansen, 2004, pp. 823).
For a given threshold variable xt−d the threshold estimate τˆ is selected by a grid
search over all potential thresholds using the sum of squared residuals as selection
criterion. An adequate number of observations on each side of the threshold is ensured
by considering only those candidate values which leave at least 20% of the observations
in each regime.
Bunzel and Enders (2010) estimate such a model for the Fed with real-time observa-
tions for inﬂation and for the output gap. They try to avoid the problem of correlation
between the explanatory variables and the error term by using current inﬂation rate
and output gap as right-hand-side variables. However, information on the output gap
is not available within the current quarter. Using its current observation as an explana-
tory variable overstates the central bank’s information set and still causes correlation
between the explanatory variables and the error term. A similar but less severe prob-
lem applies to using the current quarter’s inﬂation rate for which at least observations
on the ﬁrst two months in the quarter are available.
In contrast, in this paper we estimate the forward-looking version of the threshold
model as shown in (4). Using the threshold instrumental variable estimation approach
by Caner and Hansen (2004) we can account for the correlation between the explanatory
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variables and the error term and achieve consistent estimates of the coeﬃcients in the
monetary policy reaction function.
3 Data
Most of the ﬁrst estimates of monetary policy reaction functions (e.g. Clarida et al.,
1998) relied on ex-post revised data, i.e. on the latest data vintage available to the
researchers. Orphanides (2001, 2003) and others showed the estimates of the reaction
coeﬃcients of the Fed to change considerably if the estimation was based on real-time
data, i.e. the estimates of macroeconomic variables which were available at the point
in time the monetary policy decisions were taken.
Estimates of monetary policy reaction functions for the Bundesbank based on real-
time data were presented by Clausen and Meier (2005) and Gerberding et al. (2005).
Clausen and Meier constructed a real-time data set with observations on GDP retrieved
from Bundesbank publications and derived real-time output gap estimates by ﬁltering
these series. Gerberding et al. augmented this data set by real-time observations of
potential output, consumer prices and money growth rates from the Bundesbank’s
own publications and internal brieﬁng documents. The data set for potential output
enabled them to construct real-time observations of the output gap as perceived by
the Bundesbank.2 Using the very same data set we study the Bundesbank’s reaction
function including the possibility of threshold eﬀects. We estimate the monetary policy
reaction function using quarterly observations since information on the output gap is
only available at this frequency. Following Gerberding et al. (2005) we use for the right-
hand side variables quarterly averages of the annual percentage change in the consumer
price index and quarterly estimates of the output gap. The dependent variable is the
end of quarter observation of the three-month interest rate. This ensures that the
2For details, see Gerberding et al. (2005), pp. 279. This data set is available at the Bundesbank’s
website.
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information on the right-hand side variables was indeed available to policymakers at
the time of the interest rate decision. Our sample period is 1979Q1 to 1998Q4. This
excludes the turbulent period before the introducion of the European Exchange Rate
Mechanism and the years in which the Bundesbank’s strategy of monetary targeting
had not settled down yet.
As mentioned before, the data set also includes observations on the Bundesbank’s
target rate of inﬂation. This allows us to estimate a threshold model with switches in
the reaction function dependent on the deviation of inﬂation from the Bundesbank’s
target instead of using only the level of inﬂation as in previous studies. We represent
the inﬂation target by the Bundsbank’s “price norm” which entered the derivation of
the Bundesbank’s growth target for the money stock. Based on the quantity theory
the money growth target for year t (Mˆ∗t ) was derived as
Mˆ∗t = π
∗
t + Yˆ
pot
t − Vˆ trendt .
Yˆ pott is the expected growth rate of potential output over year t, Vˆ trendt is the long-run
(trend) change in the velocity of circulation and π∗t is the “price norm”, i.e. the change
in the price level that is considered to be consistent with maintaining price stability
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 1995, p. 83).
In order to account for the correlation between the future observations of the inﬂa-
tion rate and the output gap and the error term in the reaction function we need a
set of instruments which is uncorrelated with the forecast errors but correlated with
inﬂation and output gap forecasts. Assuming rational forecasts the forecast errors are
uncorrelated with any information available to policymakers at time t. Hence, we use
as instruments four lags of the interest rate, the period t (ﬁrst) estimate of inﬂation,
the period t (revised) estimates of inﬂation and of the output gap in the previous four
quarters and the period t value of the inﬂation target. We cannot use the current
quarter’s output gap as an instrument because this information only becomes available
with a lag of one quarter. The overidentifying restrictions imposed by the instruments
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are tested with Hansen’s J-statistic.
4 Results
4.1 A threshold model with two regimes
Table 1 presents the results of estimating a threshold monetary policy reaction function
as a Taylor rule in inﬂation and the output gap as in equation (4). The results shown
are for a version of equation (4) augmented by second autoregressive terms in the
interest rate since for many cases we found evidence of signiﬁcant autocorrelation in
the residuals with just one lag of it. An AR(2) speciﬁcation is also used in Bunzel and
Enders (2010) for the Fed and in Beyer et al. (2009) for the Bundesbank, although
the latter study does not consider threshold eﬀects. If the second autoregressive term
turned out to be not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in a regime we imposed
this zero restriction for the coeﬃcient estimates within this regime only.
The threshold variable in Table 1 is the quarter t estimate of last quarter’s inﬂation
deviation from the Bundesbank’s inﬂation target (πt−1|t − π∗t−1). Figure 1 shows the
time series of these variables. From the late 1970s on the Bundesbank has gradually
lowered its inﬂation target to two percent from the mid 1980s onwards. Actual inﬂation
exceeded this target strongly in the late 1970s up to the early 1980s and again from
the late 1980s to the mid 1990s. From 1986 to 1988 inﬂation fell considerably short of
the target.
Table 1 presents estimates for six versions of forward-looking Taylor rules with diﬀerent
forecast horizons for inﬂation (n) and for the output gap (m). As shown in the last
two columns there is evidence for signiﬁcant threshold eﬀects across all rows. The
threshold estimates for all speciﬁcations are identical and imply a break in the reaction
function if inﬂation is more than 1.3 percentage points above the Bundesbank’s inﬂation
target. Comparison of the sum of squared residuals shows the threshold model’s ﬁt
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(SSR) to be far superior to that of the linear Taylor rule (SSRf ). For the best ﬁtting
speciﬁcation (m = 3, n = 0) Figure 2 shows the result for the LR-test from Caner and
Hansen (2004) for each possible threshold value in the estimation of model (4). It tests
the null hypothesis that the nonlinearity in the monetary policy reaction function can
be modelled equally well by the threshold value on the horizontal axis as by the one
that minimizes the sum of squared residuals. The two horizontal lines represent the
critical values with the dashed line applying to the LR-test corrected for heteroscedastic
residuals. Figure 2 shows that the threshold value is estimated very precisely. Only
values between one and 1.3 percent turn out to be acceptable as threshold estimates.3
Considering the time series of the threshold variable in Figure 1 the second regime
clearly is associated with the high inﬂationary episodes in the late 1970s/early 1980s
and in the early 1990s. The point estimates for the inﬂation coeﬃcients (α1, β1) show a
slight decrease after crossing the threshold from below (α1 > β1), except for the speciﬁ-
cations with a two-quarter forecast horizon for the inﬂation rate. However, the changes
in the Taylor rule’s inﬂation coeﬃent mostly do not exceed two standard deviations.
In contrast, the coeﬃcients on the output gap are markedly higher (more than two
standard deviations) in the above threshold regime (β2 > α2) and always signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero whereas they are slightly negative in the below threshold regime.
The sum of the autoregressive coeﬃcients which represents the extent of interest rate
smoothing is smaller in the above threshold regime but mostly drops by less than two
standard deviations.
The best ﬁtting speciﬁcation assumes a forecast horizon of three quarters for the in-
ﬂation rate. If the inﬂation rate in the preceding quarter was less than 1.3 percentage
points above the Bundesbank’s inﬂation target the reaction function is estimated as
3The results for the other speciﬁcations are very similar.
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(with standard errors in parentheses)
it = −0.306 + 0.293Etπt+3 − 0.049Etyt + 1.316it−1 − 0.380it−2.
(0.204) (0.047) (0.027) (0.121) (0.122)
(5)
The estimated reaction function for the inﬂation rate in the preceding quarter in excess
of the inﬂation target of more than 1.3 percentage points is
it = 0.026 + 0.273Etπt+3 + 0.166Etyt + 0.860it−1.
(0.360) (0.061) (0.019) (0.048)
(6)
The estimate of the corresponding linear Taylor rule without threshold eﬀects with a
sum of squared residuals of 27.43 is4
it = 0.480 + 0.304Etπt+3 + 0.037Etyt + 0.815it−1.
(0.194) (0.057) (0.030) (0.027)
(7)
The coeﬃcient on the output gap is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and falls in
between the coeﬃcients of the two regimes while the coeﬃcient on the inﬂation forecast
is slightly higher than the one shown for the high inﬂation regime.
Compared to the results for the Fed presented in Bunzel and Enders (2010), which
were obtained using a similar threshold model speciﬁcation, some interesting diﬀer-
ences between the Bundesbank’s and the Fed’s reaction coeﬃcients emerge in the
threshold model.5 Below the inﬂation threshold, the Bundesbank’s response to in-
ﬂation is stronger than that of the Fed while the reverse is true for inﬂation exceeding
the threshold estimate. In both regimes the Bundesbank responds less to the output
gap than the Fed. While the estimated extent of interest rate smoothing in the below
threshold regime is very similar to the estimates in Bunzel and Enders (2010) the sum
4The results are obtained from GMM estimation using an optimal weighting matrix and robust
errors with respect to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
5We compare our results in Table 1 to those in Table 3 in Bunzel and Enders (2010), p. 940. Note,
that their estimated reaction function is not forward looking but in current inﬂation and output gap.
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of the autoregressive coeﬃcients is much higher for the Bundesbank than for the Fed
if inﬂation is above the threshold.
How do the two reaction functions from the threshold model compare in terms of mon-
etary policy tightness? Figure 3 presents the ﬁtted interest rates for both the below
and above threshold reaction functions. The shaded area indicates the time periods in
which the high inﬂation regime prevailed. It is obvious that the Bundesbank reaction
function estimated for the low inﬂation regime almost always implied interest rates at
least as high as the reaction function for the high inﬂation regime and therefore repre-
sents a more restrictive monetary policy. Even in the high inﬂation periods indicated
by the shaded areas the interest rate would have been set higher if the Bundesbank
had stuck to the ﬁrst of the two reaction functions. This result which is robust across
all model speciﬁcations in Table 1 is in contrast to the results of many other studies
for other central banks such as the Fed (Bunzel and Enders, 2010; Castro, 2008), the
ECB (Castro, 2008), and the Bank of England (Martin and Milas, 2004; Taylor and
Davradikis, 2006). These studies ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient estimates from the high in-
ﬂation regime implied a signiﬁcantly tighter monetary policy than those from the low
inﬂation regime.
4.2 A threshold model with three regimes
To explore this issue further we study a threshold model with three regimes. It is pos-
sible that the time period in the mid 1980s with inﬂation well below the Bundesbank’s
target but an interest rate only slowly trending downward might indicate a third set
of reaction coeﬃcients that gets mixed up with the other two sets of coeﬃcients if we
restrict ourselves to a model with two regimes only.
The threshold estimates in the second column of Table 2 show that the new low inﬂation
regime is relevant if the inﬂation rate in the preceding quarter was less than the inﬂation
target plus 0.2 percentage points. It dominates the mid 1980s and is also relevant in the
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ﬁnal years before the introduction of the Euro (Figure 4). The second regime applies
to inﬂation rates that deviate more than 0.2 but less than 1.3 percentage points from
the Bundesbank’s target and the third one applies to inﬂation rates even higher. All
model speciﬁcations in Table 2 lead to identical threshold estimates. From the low to
the medium and then to the high inﬂation regime Table 2 shows an inverted U-shaped
pattern for the inﬂation coeﬃcient which is generally highest in the medium inﬂation
regime. However, the size of most of these changes is less than two standard deviations.
The response coeﬃcients to the output gap are mostly not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero in both the low and the medium inﬂation regime and increase strongly in the high
inﬂation regime - a result which carries over from the two-regime threshold model.
Similarly to Table 1 we also ﬁnd less interest rate smoothing, i.e. a lower sum of AR
coeﬃcients in the high inﬂation regime.
Figure 5 shows the ﬁtted values for the interest rate that are implied by the three
reaction functions for the threshold model with a three-quarter forecast horizon for
inﬂation and a one-quarter forecast horizon for the output gap (n = 3,m = 1) which
among the models in Table 2 displays some of the most sizable changes in the coeﬃ-
cients. The three panels diﬀer only by the shading which indicates the time periods
in which the low inﬂation (top), medium inﬂation (middle) and high inﬂation regime
(bottom) prevailed. Again, the reaction coeﬃcients for the high inﬂation regime (dash-
dotted line) imply the least restrictive monetary policy and the lowest interest rates
throughout the sample period. Although the ﬁtted interest rates from the two other
sets of reaction coeﬃcients are very close to each other the reaction function for the
low inﬂation regime (dotted line) generally implies a higher interest rate than the other
two reaction functions if the low inﬂation regime is relevant.
Since growth rates of monetary aggregates were very important in the communication
strategy of the Bundesbank (e.g Deutsche Bundesbank, 1995; von Hagen, 1999) we
also estimated threshold models of monetary policy reaction functions augmented by
real-time estimates of the deviation of the growth rate of M3 from the Bundesbank’s
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announced target growth rate and found our main results to be unaﬀected.6
Our results from the three-regimes threshold models so far indicate that the Bundes-
bank switched to a more restrictive monetary policy stance when inﬂation exceeded its
inﬂation target by about 0.2 percentage points. However, we also found evidence for
a less restrictive monetary policy if inﬂation was strongly above the target, i.e. in the
third regime. One possible explanation for this puzzling result is that the inﬂation gap
in Figure 1 actually overstates the true inﬂation deviation from target during episodes
of drastically higher inﬂation. Such a mismeasurement of the inﬂation gap could result
from unobserved (temporary) shifts in the inﬂation target.
4.3 A threshold model with a moving average inflation target
The prevalence of the high inﬂation regime in the early 1980s and in the early 1990s
was associated with relatively persistent inﬂationary shocks hitting the German econ-
omy - in the ﬁrst episode the second oil price shock, in the second episode the German
re-uniﬁcation. Figure 1 shows that during the ﬁrst inﬂationary surge the Bundesbank’s
inﬂation target was initially at 4%, signiﬁcantly above the 2% on average in the later
sample, and then was revised slowly downwards. In the high inﬂation period following
the re-uniﬁcation of Germany the inﬂation target remained constant at 2%. One pos-
sibility which might distort our results is that this oﬃcially announced inﬂation target
of the Bundesbank which was almost constant from 1983 onwards does not convey the
actual intermediate term policy objective.
Bunzel and Enders (2010) replace an implicit constant long-run inﬂation target in the
threshold variable by a moving average intermediate (or interim) inﬂation target which
is deﬁned as a moving average of past inﬂation rates.7 They propose this speciﬁcation
6The eﬀect of this modiﬁcation is that the coﬃcient on inﬂation becomes statistically insignifcantly
diﬀerent from zero in the high inﬂation regime. Furthermore, the money growth deviation turns out
to be either insigniﬁcant in the low inﬂation regime or enters with the wrong, i.e. negative sign in the
high inﬂation regime. The results are available from the author by request.
7Speciﬁcally, they deﬁne the inﬂation target as π∗t = (πt−5 + πt−9)/2.
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to represent empirically an opportunistic approach to monetary policy (Bomﬁn and
Rudebusch, 2000). In the opportunistic approach to disinﬂation the central bank ac-
cepts temporarily a rise in inﬂation and remains relatively inactive waiting for favorable
shocks or the adjustment of the economy to the steady state to let inﬂation decline
gradually. Bunzel and Enders (2010) threshold speciﬁcation conditions the inﬂation
target on past inﬂation. A regime shift in the monetary policy reaction function occurs
if inﬂation is high relative to the value of inﬂation “inherited” from the past. Bunzel
and Enders (2010, p. 943) interpret their estimates of a signiﬁcant increase in the Fed’s
reaction coeﬃcients to inﬂation and the output gap if inﬂation is above the intermedi-
ate target as evidence for opportunistic behavior of the Fed. However, according to the
theoretical models of Bomﬁn and Rudebusch (2000), Orphanides and Wilcox (2002),
and Aksoy et al. (2006) the dependence of the intermediate target on past inﬂation
can be, on its own, already interpreted as evidence in favor of opportunistic behavior.
A speciﬁcation with an inﬂation target depending on past inﬂation is useful for our
study as well: First, it allows us to study whether we can ﬁnd evidence for opportunistic
behavior of the Bundesbank. Second, assuming a moving intermediate inﬂation target
can explain some of our puzzling results: Using the three-regimes threshold models
we found the Bundesbank’s monetary policy to become less restrictive after very high
deviations of inﬂation from the announced long-term inﬂation target. Comparing Fig-
ures 1 and 3 the coeﬃcient estimates of the high inﬂation regime are determined by
two episodes in which inﬂation rose quickly and (particularly in the early 1990s) came
down only slowly. Both episodes were caused by persistent inﬂationary shocks (oil price
shock and German re-uniﬁcation) of which the inﬂationary eﬀects could not be undone
quickly. It is possible that the Bundesbank accepted a temporary increase in inﬂation
and raised its intermediate term inﬂation target without changing the long-run inﬂa-
tion target. This would imply that, particulary during the slow decline in inﬂation,
inﬂation was actually closer to the (temporary intermediate) inﬂation target than to
the long-run inﬂation target (the price norm) and, hence, our models from the pre-
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vious subsection overstate the deviation in the threshold variable over these episodes
and might lead to distorted results. In fact, the Bundesbank emphasized that its price
norm of 2% after 1984 applied to the medium-term perspective (Deutsche Bundesbank,
1995, p. 83).
Table 3 presents results for various model speciﬁcations with moving average inﬂation
targets. The monetary policy reaction function is speciﬁed as in Table 1 with the
inﬂation rate and the output gap as explanatory variables. Speciﬁcation (1) uses as
threshold variable a weighted average of the Bundesbank’s oﬃcial inﬂation target and of
the actually observed inﬂation rates 5 and 9 quarters ago, i.e. π∗t = (π¯∗t +πt−5+πt−9)/3,
with π¯∗t as the oﬃcial inﬂation targets. This speciﬁcation combines the announced
inﬂation target with the threshold variable used in Bunzel and Enders (2010). Including
the announced inﬂation target in the weighted average conforms to the suggestion in
Bomﬁm and Rudebusch (2000).
In terms of ﬁt the models are inferior to those based on the long-run inﬂation target,
a result that mirrors the evidence in Bunzel and Enders (2010) for the Fed. The
threshold estimate τˆ is relativly close to zero for the reaction function with a three
quarter forecast horizon for inﬂation. The diﬀerence between the two inﬂation reaction
coeﬃcients is always less than one standard deviation indicating no signiﬁcant change
in the Bundesbank’s reaction to inﬂation. Compared to Bunzel and Enders’ (2010)
estimate of the Fed’s response coeﬃcient to inﬂation the Bundesbank’s response is
stronger in the low inﬂation regime.8 The estimated coeﬃcient on the output gap is
signiﬁcantly negative in the below threshold regime but signiﬁcantly positive in the
above threshold regime. Finally, the sum of the AR coeﬃcients does not diﬀer by
much across regimes but is much smaller than Bunzel and Enders’ estimates for the
Fed. The constant term in the reaction function which is not shown in the table also
increases drastically in the above relative to the below threshold regime.
8See Bunzel and Enders (2010), Table 4, p. 944. Relative to some speciﬁcations in their paper the
Bundesbank reacted more aggressively to inﬂation in the above threshold regime as well.
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Figure 6 shows the ﬁtted interest rate paths for both the above and below threshold
reaction function in the ﬁrst row in Table 6. Clearly, the above threshold reaction
function implies a tighter monetary policy stance, i.e. a higher interest rate if inﬂa-
tion is above the estimated threshold. In particular, the interest rate from the above
threshold reaction function exceeds the one from the below threshold reaction function
in those parts of the shaded regions where interest rates are increasing. Interestingly,
the reaction function estimated for the below threshold regime does not always lead to
a lower interest rate compared to the other reaction function if inﬂation is below the
threshold. In the 1982-1984 period when the output gap was strongly negative the be-
low threshold reaction function with its negative output gap coeﬃcient led to a higher
interest rate than would have resulted from the above threshold reaction function. In
this episode the estimated reaction function captures the Bundesbank’s reluctance in
pushing down the interest rate quickly in response to the deteriorating output condi-
tions. Probably, the negatively estimated output gap coeﬃcient in the below threshold
reaction function is partly due to this episode.
The next rows in Table 3 show results for various modiﬁcations of the threshold model
with a moving average inﬂation target in order to study the robustness of the results.
Speciﬁcation (2) is based on the same threshold variable but imposes a threshold value
of zero. Model (3) shifts the moving average of past inﬂation rates used to construct
the moving inﬂation target to observations to t − 4 and t − 8. Finally, the results
shown under (4) are those using a threshold variable identical to the one in Bunzel
and Enders (2010), i.e. a simple moving average of πt−5 and πt−9. These modiﬁcations
have very little eﬀects on the results. Note that the estimated threshold values for both
models in (1) and (3) are negative. Although imposing a zero threshold value in model
(2) leaves the results mostly unchanged (compare speciﬁcations (1) and (2)) these
negative estimates might indicate that our intermediate inﬂation target overstates the
true intermediate inﬂation target to some extent and that the opportunistic behaviour
of the Bundesbank as far as its intermediate inﬂation target is concerned is actually less
20
pronounced than assumed by our weighted average of past inﬂation and the long-run
inﬂation target.
5 Conclusions
This paper presented evidence on signiﬁcant threshold eﬀects in the monetary policy
reaction function of the Deutsche Bundesbank with a special focus on using appropri-
ate real-time data to model the information set available to the Bundesbank’s policy-
makers. Using past deviations of inﬂation from the Bundesbank’s inﬂation target as
threshold variable we showed systematic shifts in the reaction functions across regimes.
Speciﬁcally, we found that the reaction function triggered by high deviations of inﬂa-
tion from target implied a much stronger response to the output gap. Comparing the
implied interest rate paths across the reaction functions in the two regimes we found
the coeﬃcient estimates in the high inﬂation regime to imply a less restrictive mone-
tary policy, i.e. lower interest rates, for almost all historically observed states of the
economy. These results were robust across a range of forecast horizons for inﬂation and
the output gap in the monetary policy reaction function. Introducing a third regime
associated with the very low inﬂation rates in the mid 1980s also left our results intact.
These surprising results led us to consider a time-varying intermediate inﬂation target
as an average of the announced inﬂation target and past inﬂation rates. Using the
deviation of inﬂation from this moving target we found evidence for the Bundesbank
switching to a more restrictive monetary policy regime when inﬂation was above the
intermediate target. This shift in the monetary policy reaction function was associated
with a signiﬁcantly positive response of the Bundesbank to the output gap and an
increase in the reaction function’s constant. In contrast, the reaction coeﬃcient for
inﬂation is very similar for both regimes.
One interesting aspect of our results is that, in contrast to estimates of monetary policy
reaction function with inﬂation thresholds for other central banks, we do not ﬁnd evi-
21
dence for a strong increase in the Bundesbank’s reaction to inﬂation if inﬂation crosses
the estimated threshold value from below. In fact, the strength of the Bundesbank’s
reaction to inﬂation appears to be the same independent of the size of the deviation of
inﬂation from target. What does change signiﬁcantly between regimes is the response
to the output gap. A second important ﬁnding is that the evidence for opportunistic
behavior of the Bundesbank is weaker than that for the Fed. We use a similar approach
as Bunzel and Enders (2010) and deﬁne an intermediate inﬂation target as a weighted
average of past inﬂation and the announced inﬂation target and use this time series to
construct the inﬂation gap threshold variable. In contrast to their results for the Fed
we ﬁnd only a signiﬁcant increase in the response of the Bundesbank to the output gap
but no signiﬁcant change in the inﬂation response of the Bundesbank when inﬂation
moved above the intermediate target.
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Figure 1: Inﬂation rate, price norm and inﬂation gap.
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Figure 2: Inﬂation gap threshold estimation for standard Taylor rule (n=3,m=0).
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Figure 3: 3-months interest rate and ﬁtted values from both regimes (n=3,m=0),
inﬂation gap threshold.
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Figure 4: Inﬂation gap and threshold estimates for three regimes (n=3,m=1).
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Figure 5: 3-months interest rate and ﬁtted values from three regimes (n=3,m=1),
inﬂation gap threshold.
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Figure 6: 3-months interest rate and ﬁtted values from two regimes (n=3,m=0) with
moving average inﬂation target (Table 3, model (1)).
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